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GYPSUM INTENT AND FELONIOUS
CONSPIRACIES UNDER SECTION 1 OF
THE SHERMAN ACT: U.S. v. GILLEN
Cases involving violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act'
have acquired a new dimension since the United States Supreme
Court's decision of United States v. United States Gypsum. 2 The
Supreme Court held in Gypsum that ". . . the criminal offenses
defined by the Sherman Act should be construed as including in-
tent as an element."' 3 Post Gypsum convictions under section 1 of
the Sherman Act invariably have been appealed where intent was
not incorporated into the jury instructions as an essential element
of the offense.4 In reality, however, post Gypsum criminal antitrust
cases have not substantively or procedurally changed much in the
wake of the Supreme Court's apparent mandate requiring the gov-
ernment to prove that the accused possessed knowledge of the
probable consequences of his acts. 5 United States v. Gillen, having
held -that intent is not an element of criminal antitrust offenses
classified as illegal per se, is illustrative of the confusion that has
followed the Gypsum decision.6
Thomas J. Gillen was among a group charged with conspiring
to fix, stabilize, and maintain prices of anthracite coal in unrea-
sonable restraint of interstate trade and commerce in violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act during the period from 1966 to 1973.
7
The defendants were engaged in the mining and processing of an-
thracite coal and virtually controlled the entire national anthracite
coal market.' The Anthracite Producers Advisory Board, composed
of representatives of the major producers, met monthly from
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
438 U.S. 422 (1978).
Id. at 443.
See, e.g., United States v. Brighton Bldg. & Maintenance, 598 F.2d 1101 (7th
Cir. 1979); United States v. Foley, 598 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1979). These cases deal
with antitrust activity which, prior to Gypsum, would have undoubtedly been
regarded illegal per se.
I Prior to the Gypsum holding, jury instructions generally included a conclu-
sive presumption of intent upon a showing of a conspiracy to fix prices. See, e.g.,
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), and specifically,
United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105 (1948).
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1961 through November of 1973 to consider the total anthracite
production quota as provided in the federally authorized Produc-
tion Control Plan for the Anthracite Industry.' After these
"authorized" meetings, these same persons would discuss prices
four or five times a year, and reach a consensus as to current price
as well as contemplated future changes in price."
After tentative agreements were reached, the members of the
Board would secure approval of the planned price activity from
their superiors. The prices were then circulated via "anthracite
price circulars"." There was ample evidence that defendant Gillen
knew of, and in fact approved the price agreements.' 2 Gillen was
tried in United States District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania and found guilty of conspiring to fix prices in viola-
tion of section 1 of the Sherman Act.' 3
Gillen appealed his conviction to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit urging that (1) the district court
erred in not making specific findings of intent, and (2) that the
evidence was insufficient to support the verdict.'4 The court of
appeals affirmed the conviction in holding (1) that the offense
committed by Gillen was illegal per se and as a result no showing
of intent was required, and (2) that the evidence did support the
verdict.'- It is the purpose of this article to examine the court of
appeals, holding that intent was not an element of the purported
violation of the Sherman Act. With respect to this holding, the
court of appeals stated:
Thus in price-fixing conspiracies, where the conduct is illegal
per se, no inquiry has to be made on the issue of intent beyond
proof that one joined or formed the conspiracy."'
It is this language in particular, and similar language in other post
Gypsum cases which must be reconciled with the Gypsum holding.
In developing this analysis it is necessary to (1) briefly develop
9Id.
11 Id. These "after meetings" were outside the federally authorized activities
of the Board.
z Id.
I' Id. at 543.
'3 458 F. Supp. 887 (M.D. Pa. 1978).
" 599 F.2d 541 (3rd Cir. 1979).
Id. at 548.
" Id. at 545.
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the history of and the purpose for the per'se doctrine, (2) review
the recent amendment to section 1 of the Sherman Act and evalu-
ate its significance to the present issue, and (3) evaluate Gillen in
light of this analysis and the Supreme Court's holding in Gypsum.
Development of the Per Se Doctrine
Due to the Sherman Act's lack of specificity,'7 any analysis of
the expansive field of antitrust is necessarily difficult, and for this
reason, the courts, for the most part, have been uninhibited in
formulating the scope of antitrust enforcement. The resulting case
law, at least with respect to section 1 violations, is not particularly
helpful in forecasting a court's decision in a given set of circum-
stances.'" While the Sherman Act does not facilitate predictability,
it has fostered the protection of unfettered competition through its
inherent flexibility.'
9
The courts, responding to Congress' failure to delineate the
activities outlawed by the Sherman Act, came to rely heavily on
the rule of reason."0 The rule of reason is best understood when
viewed on a continuum. One end of that continuum comprises
those activities clearly not prohibited by the Act.' On the other
end of the continuum lie those activities, which because of "their
pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue
are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore ille-
gal. . . ."I In between these extreme classifications of activity lie
those activities subject to the rule of reason, i.e., a weighing of "all
of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive
" E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), reads in part: "Every contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."
is See generally Comment, United States v. United States Gypsum Co.: Put-
ting a Lid on Container, 45 BROOKLYN L. REV. 417, 422-24 (1979). Many factors such
as market structure, market power, the characteristics of the good or service in
question, etc., play an important role in the courts' disposition of antitrust cases.
, Id. at 422.
The rule of reason, as it pertains to antitrust litigation, was formulated in
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). See Continental T.V., Inc. v.
G.T.E. Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), for a good discussion of the Supreme
Court's current viewpoint on rule of reason analysis.
1' Sullivan has said, "Congress could not have meant literally to ban every
contract which in any sense restrains trade. Virtually every contract does this to
some extent." L. SULuVAN, AN'rrRUST 165 (1976 ed.).
u Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
1979]
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practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable re-
straint on competition."" The distinguishing point between per se
rules and the rule of reason is that application or formulation of a
per se rule obviates the need for future litigation regarding that
particular practice. More simply, formulation or application of a
per se rule will "require the Court to make broad generalizations
about the social utility of particular commercial practices."24 As a
result, "per se rules of illegality are appropriate only when they
relate to conduct that is manifestly anticompetitive. '" ' 5 Rule of
reason analysis, on the other hand, encompasses the balancing
process alluded to above.
Per se illegality was firmly established in the field of antitrust
law in the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Trenton
Potteries.2" The Court, while addressing the issue of price-fixing,
stated that, "[a]greements which create such potential power
may well be held to be in themselves unreasonable or unlawful
restraints, without necessity of minute inquiry whether a particu-
lar price is reasonable or unreasonable. . . .
Any questions left unsettled by Trenton Potteries on the issue
of per se illegality 8 were answered by the United States Supreme
Court in United States v. Socony- Vacuum Oil Co. 2 The Court held
in Socony that "[u]nder the Sherman Act a combination formed
for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing,
pegging, or stablizing the price of a commodity in interstate com-
merce is illegal per se."30
433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977).
2 Id. at n.16.
433 U.S. at 49-50.
- 273 U.S. 392 (1927). Corporations engaged in the manufacturing of vitreous
pottery and controlling 82% of the market formed a cartel which had the effect
of fixing prices and limiting sales.
21 Id. at 397.
21 Two such questions left open by Trenton Potteries were (1) could the govern-
ment sustain its burden of proof by merely showing an agreement to fix prices, or
must they also prove that those in agreement possessed substantial market power
to effect prices, and (2) whether alternative social gains may be metered off against
the harm to competition. See L. SuLovA, ANTITRUST 183-84 (1976 ed.).
- 310 U.S. 150 (1940). Several major oil companies entered a concerted pro-
gram aimed at controlling the supply of gasoline in an attempt to stabilize its price.
0 Id. at 223. The court points out by footnote that the combination alone is
illegal, without a showing of purpose and effect.
[Vol. 82
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The reasoning advanced in the Trenton Potteries case, as ar-
ticulated by Socony, has effectively dominated antitrust law deal-
ing with price-fixing for the past half-century. These two cases
were used to support the court of appeals holding in the Gillen
case.3'
Recently, through passage of the Antitrust Procedures and
Penalties Act,3" Congress substantially increased the penalties lev-
ied against Sherman Act violators. An analysis of this amendment
to the Sherman Act will suggest that the per se rule should no
longer apply to criminal prosecutions under its terms.-
The Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974
The Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act made drastic
changes in the penalties levied against those found in violation of
the antitrust laws. The Act (1) reclassified violations of the Sher-
man Act from misdemeanors to felonies, (2) increased the maxi-
mum fines against violators from $50,000 to $1 million for corpora-
tions and $100,000 for any other person, and (3) increased the
possible prison term from one year to three years.34 Congress' mo-
tive for enacting this portion of the amendment was to "beef-up"
the consequences of antitrust activity so as to deter such activity."
The Act clearly manifests Congress' increasing disfavor with anti-
trust violations.
3 6
Because of these more stringent criminal sanctions, those pro-
secuted for criminal antitrust violations should be afforded greater
protection. The United States Supreme Court recently agreed. In
United States v. United States Gypsum, the Court, referring to the
Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, stated, "The severity of
these sanctions provides further support for our conclusion that the
31 599 F.2d 541 (3rd Cir. 1979).
32 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1976).
3 See text infra, n.31-45.
3' Id. In addition to increasing the penalties for Sherman Act violations, the
Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act made considerable changes in the much
used consent decree process and the appellate process as it concerns antitrust
litigation. See generally, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1962.
3 In the words of one Senator: "This increase is designed to deter those who
might conspire to fix prices or to monopolize a given market." 120 CoNG. Rc. 36340
(1974).
31 Id. at 36337-46.
1979]
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Sherman Act should not be construed as creating strict-liability
crimes."
3
This recent amendment to the Sherman Act and its subse-
quent interpretation in Gypsum evidence the need to reevaluate
the proper role of mens rea in criminal prosecutions under the
Act.u The following two reasons would require greater deference to
mens rea in criminal prosecutions under the antitrust laws, and
therefore, would form the basis of such a reevaluation.
The reclassification of criminal antitrust violations from mis-
demeanors to felonies brings such violations in parity with other
felonious conspiracies against the United States. Thus, absent
strong public policy reasons to substantiate the discrepancy, those
prosecuted under the antitrust laws should be given the same pro-
tection as those prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. section 371. 18 U.S.C.
section 371 makes it illegal to conspire to commit an offense
against, or to defraud, the United States, as compared to 15 U.S.C.
section 1, which deals specifically with conspiracies in restraint of
trade.
A comparison of the respective sanctions of the two United
States Code sections further supports the analogy. Violations of 18
U.S.C. section 371 subject the convicted to not more than $10,000
in fines and not more than five years in prison. Persons convicted
of conspiracies under the Sherman Act, as a result of the recent
amendment, are subjected to not more than $100,000 in fines and
not more than three years in prison. Although Sherman Act viola-
tors are subjected to two less years in prison, they stand to be fined
tenfold the amount of those committing general conspiracy offen-
ses. Arguably then, since those being prosecuted under the respec-
tive acts may suffer equally severe consequences, they should be
afforded equal protection39 from those consequences.
It is well settled that in prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. section
371, the government must prove that each defendant charged with
- 438 U.S. 422, 442 (1978). It should be noted that the increased penalties of
the 1974 amendment did not apply to the Gypsum case. This is significant in that
the Court saw a need to grant greater protection to those prosecuted under the
Sherman Act even under the pre-1974 penalties.
United States v. Nu-Phonics, 433 F. Supp. 1006, 1015 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
Equal protection is used here in the general sense and is not to be confused
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the conspiracy had the criminal intent necessary to meet the re-
quirements set forth in the substantive offense.4 ' Following this
analogy to its necessary conclusion, the government should have
the burden of proving that those prosecuted for criminal violations
of section 1 of the Sherman Act had a specific intent to restrain
trade.
But, the Supreme Court in Gypsum directly rejected the
suggestion that specific intent must be shown to sustain
misdemeanor convictions under the antitrust laws.' However, the
1974 amendment did not apply to the facts of that case; hence, it
cannot be said that the Gypsum holding was intended to limit the
degree of intent required for felony convictions under the Act.
The contrary view is that judicial economy may be one justifi-
cation for labeling certain antitrust activities per se illegal." As a
result, judicial economy may be a valid public policy reason for
allowing the per se rule to maintain its current state in criminal
antitrust litigation. It has been said that those engaged in a con-
spiracy which necessarily and directly restrains trade "must be
held to have intended the necessary and direct consequences of
their acts. . ."4 By allowing these conclusive presumptions of
intent, the government's burden of proof has been lighter and this
has facilitated the fight against restraints of trade. However, while
it might be argued that saddling the government with proving the
"elusive" element of mental state, or intent, would unnecessarily
burden them and hinder their ability to bring successful criminal
prosecutions, this is not the case. By use of inferences,44 which are
usually easily drawn in cases of blatant violations, the government
o United States v. Young, 575 F.2d 828, 830 (10th Cir. 1978).
" 438 U.S. at 446. The court states: "A requirement of proof not only of this
knowledge of likely effects, but also of a conscious desire to bring them to fruition
or to violate the law would seem, particularly in such a context, both unnecessarily
cumulative and unduly burdensome."
12 See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. G.T.E. Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.
16 (1977).
United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525, 543 (1919).
" Black's Law Dictionary notes that: "[a] 'presumption' and an 'inference'
are not the same thing, a presumption being a deduction which the law requires a
trier of facts to make, an inference being a deduction which the trier may or may
not make, according to his own conclusions; a presumption is mandatory, an infer-
ence permissible." It is the presumptions of intent and not inferences on the issue
of intent which the U.S. Supreme Court struck down in Gypsum.
1979]
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may well meet its burden of proof, while at the same time affording
the accused the requisite protection. The United States Supreme
Court laid the base for this reasoning in Gypsum by (1) declaring
all conclusive presumptions on the issue of intent illegal, and (2)
by providing for proof of intent through "evidence and inferences
drawn therefrom."4
In sum, a reevaluation of the role of mens rea in criminal
antitrust litigation suggests the government should be required to
prove the accused had a specific intent to restrain trade. 6 Judicial
economy will not suffer substantially since the liberal use of infer-
ences will lighten the otherwise heavy burden normally associated
with proving criminal intent.
A second reason supporting the premise that specific intent
should be a necessary element of all criminal antitrust offenses is
found in the Sherman Act's very nature: its lack of specificity.
Referring to the ambiguous language in the Sherman Act, it has
been stated that "[a]ntitrust policy touches fields and boundaries
which recede as you approach them and disappear each time you
try to stake them out."'" As a result of this ambiguity, some exami-
nations of Sherman Act violations closely resemble the analysis
used under the void for vagueness doctrine. 8 While the constitu-
tionality of the Sherman Act is unquestioned here, the point is that
since the defendants charged thereunder do not benefit from an a
priori legislative determination of the acts considered unlawful,
greater protection of these defendants, through proof of specific
intent, is desirable. This position coincides with the traditional
"fair notice" principle of criminal law that "conduct may not be
treated as criminal unless it has been so defined by an authority
438 U.S. at 435.
, This increased burden of proof would apply only to individuals charged with
criminal violations of the Sherman Act. The burden of proof in civil cases and in
the prosecution of corporations would remain unchanged.
41 Statement made by Thurmon Arnold as cited in S. Kadish, Some Observa-
tions on the Use of Criminal Sanctions In Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U.
Cm. L. REv. 423, 427 (1963).
" The Sherman Act has previously been attacked for its vagueness in Nash v.
United States, 229 U.S. 373, 376-78 (1913), but the Court, speaking through Justice
Holmes, upheld the statute noting that the Act's indeterminate standards did not
constitute a fatal constitutional objection. However, this factor (the Act's vague-
ness) has been deemed particularly relevant by those people charged with enforcing
the Sherman Act's criminal and remedial sanctions. See United States v. U.S.
Gypsum, 438 U.S. 422, 439 (1978).
[Vol. 82
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having the institutional competence to do so before it has taken
place." 9
The Sherman Act's bare compliance with the "fair notice"
doctrine, especially when considering the Act's severe criminal
penalties, strongly supports the premise that specific intent should
be an element of all criminal antitrust offenses.
United States v. Gillen
Despite the holding in Gillen" that intent need not be consid-
ered an element of per se violations of the Sherman Act as it relates
to the Administrative Procedures and Penalties Act, the Gillen
case must also be evaluated in view of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in United States v. United States Gypsum." This bifurcated
analysis is required since the Gypsum decision dealt with a misde-
meanor, and not a felony conviction.
Upon Gillen's assertion that his conviction be reversed due to
the lower court's failure to make "specific findings of intent"," the
Third Circuit held:
Thus in price fixing conspiracies, where the conduct is illegal
per se, no inquiry has to be made on the issue of intent beyond
proof that one joined or formed the conspiracy.n
In addition to being erroneous, or undesirable, when viewed in
light of the Administrative Procedures and Penalties Act, the
Gillen holding also conflicts with the Gypsum decision.
The Gillen decision managed to circumvent the Gypsum hold-
ing in two separate ways. First, in distinguishing Gypsum, the
Third Circuit stated that "[t]he Court did not intend any extraor-
dinary change in the rules of law on price-fixing cases because, by
its very citation of Socony Vacuum, the court acknowledged that
price-fixing cases are an exception."5 This is a very strained inter-
pretation of the Gypsum holding, especially in view of that court's
unequivocal statement that "[c]riminal offenses defined by the
A, H. PACKER, THE LimITs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 79 (1968).
599 F.2d 541 (3rd Cir. 1979).
5' 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
52 599 F.2d at 542.
" Id. at 545.
5' 599 F.2d at 544.
19791
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Sherman Act should be construed as including intent as an ele-
ment.""
The Supreme Court did not infer that any criminal anitrust
offenses should be excused from their holding.56 The Gypsum
Court elicited their general disfavor for non-mens rea offenses, and
applied this to the Sherman Act specifically when they stated,
"We are unwilling to construe the Sherman Act as mandating a
regime of strict-liability offenses.""1
In holding that price-fixing cases were excluded from the
Gypsum holding, the Third Circuit stated:
We believe the Supreme Court's statement in Gypsum on in-
tent was born out of a concern for borderline violations and was
not meant to modify past precedent on price-fixing conspira-
cies ....
In support of this statement the Third Circuit quoted an excerpt
from the Gypsum opinion." While an isolated reading of this
quoted material might be read in accordance with the Third Cir-
cuit's conclusion, the impact of the Gypsum opinion, when read in
its entirety, supports the contrary conclusion-that intent is an
essential element of all criminal antitrust offenses, price-fixing
conspiracies included.
For example, the Supreme Court stated in Gypsum that
intent is an element of a criminal antitrust offense ... and
cannot be taken from the trier of fact through reliance on a legal
presumption of wrongful intent .... A
Verifying this statement the Court noted its general disfavor to-
wards strict liability offenses. Going further, the Gypsum court
sfates that the general requirement of mens rea in criminal stat-
utes is "at least equally salient in the antitrust context."I It is
438 U.S. at 443.
as 599 F.2d at 548. (Concurring opinion of Judge Adams).
438 U.S. at 436.
599 F.2d at 544.
" Id. at 544. The excerpt quoted described antitrust activity as behavior
"difficult to distinguish from the gray zone of socially accepted and economically
justifiable business conduct." In the process of describing this bulk of antitrust
activity the Court distinguished, as an exception, that conduct "regarded as per se
illegal because of its unquestionably anti-competitive (side) effects."
438 U.S. at 435.
, Id. at 440.
(Vol. 82
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obvious that the Supreme Court had no intentions of excepting
price-fixing conspiracies from their ultimate holding that intent
must be shown to sustain criminal convictions under the antitrust
laws.
A final point in support of this conclusion is found in the
Supreme Court's dichotomy of civil and criminal prosecutions
under the Sherman Act. The Court notes that their holding in the
Gypsum case is not intended to change the rule that a civil viola-
tion may be proven without a showing of intent.2 This evidences
the Court's intention to change the law relating to criminal prose-
cution in general and controverts the Third Circuit's statement
that "the Court did not intend any extraordinary change in the
rules of law on price-fixing cases ... "I'
Secondly, the Third Circuit managed to circumvent the
Gypsum holding by directly contradicting that holding with re-
spect to jury instructions in antitrust cases. Gypsum involved a set
of jury instructions where the lower court allowed a conclusive
presumption on the issue of intent." The Supreme Court held that
intent "cannot be taken from the trier of fact through reliance on
a legal presumption of wrongful intent. . ".."I' Gypsum held in
short that intent was an element of criminal antitrust offenses and
the presence or absence of this element must ultimately be decided
by the jury.
In apparent contradiction, the Gillen court held that "intent
requirements will always be met in a case involving a price fixing
conspiracy. If a defendant intends to fix prices, he necessarily in-
tends to restrain trade." 6' This is the very type of instruction that
was ruled improper in the Gypsum case.'7
In spite of the obvious deficiences in the Gillen decision, the
Third Circuit probably reached the correct decision. The correct
reasoning was espoused by Judge Adams, who disagreed totally
, Id. at 436.
599 F.2d at 544.
" 438 U.S. at 430. The instructions stated in part: "The law presumes that a
person intends the necessary and natural consequences of his acts. Therefore, if the
effect of the exchanges of pricing information was to raise, fix, maintain, and
stabilize prices, then the parties to them are presumed, as a matter of law, to have
intended that result."
' 438 U.S. at 435.
" 599 F.2d at 545.
,T See n.60, supra.
1979]
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with the majority's reasoning on the intent issue yet concurred in
the final decision. Judge Adams reasoned that the trial judge's
failure "to make an explicit determination regarding intent did
'not affect the substantial rights of Gillen.' "68 The trial court sat
without knowledge of the Gypsum holding and Gillen's acts were
so blatant that a reversal, where inferences on the issue of intent
are so easily drawn, is unnecessary.
Judge Adams strongly supports the premise that intent is now
an element of all criminal antitrust offenses, and further states his
disagreement with the majority's approval of conclusive presump-
tions on the issue of intent in price-fixing cases. 9 Judge Adams"
analysis and reasoning coincides with much of the analysis and
reasoning appearing in this article.
Gillen, while being subjected to a gross misreading of the cur-
rent state of the law as it relates to antitrust litigation, was not
substantially prejudiced by the final decision of the Third Circuit.
Gillen's attempt to perfect an appeal to the United States Su-
preme Court ended when the Supreme Court denied his applica-
tion for a writ of certiorari.
Conclusion
While the Gillen case involved a misstatement of the law
rather than an improper verdict, the premise that the government
should be required to prove specific intent in all criminal antitrust
cases remains intact. This premise is buttressed by the Gypsum
holding and further by the severe consequences of the Administra-
tive Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974. An analysis of the severd
penalties which this Act levies against antitrust violators suggests
that they be afforded greater protection in the way of making
specific intent a required element. Finally, support is found for the
premise in the very nature of the Sherman Act. Its bare compliance
with the "fair notice" doctrine makes affording these defendants
greater protection particularly desirable. In light of all this it is
imperative that courts begin to redefine the role of mens rea in
criminal antitrust litigation.
Larry W. Blalock
599 F.2d at 548.
" Id. at 548-51.
[Vol. 82
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